# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND THIRTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 13 June 1996, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Akram (Pakistan)

GE.96-62234 (E)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 738th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Canada, New Zealand, Switzerland, Germany, Australia, Mexico, Japan, Chile, the Republic of Korea, Norway, Sweden, Belgium, as well as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. I now have pleasure in giving the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Moher.

Mr. MOHER (Canada): Mr. President, I wish first of all, on behalf of myself and my delegation, to congratulate you on your presidency of the Conference on Disarmament at this crucial juncture of its efforts to advance the disarmament objectives shared by us all. We know you will devote your very considerable diplomatic skills and substantive knowledge to facilitate our achievement of a good CTBT by the end of this month. We will do our best to work with you to that end.

There are three topics which I wish to address briefly this morning. First, we must refer to the recent Chinese nuclear-test explosion. Canada deplores that test as we have all earlier test explosions. We have been and remain strongly opposed to all nuclear explosions by any State in any environment and under whatever name. Thus, while we welcome China's decision to initiate a testing moratorium by the end of September 1996, we regret China's intention to conduct a further test and call on China to reconsider and cease testing now.

This brings me to the second point I wish to raise this morning. That point arises from the interesting and far-reaching statement made by Ambassador Sha in this Conference on 6 June 1996. Canada welcomes the assertion by Ambassador Sha that "the Chinese Government has made a political decision to participate in earnest in the CTBT negotiations". We had, and have, no doubts in that respect and regard the outline of China's position on a number of key issues contained in the 6 June statement as a useful contribution to our ongoing negotiations. But we do wish to re-emphasize one point upon which Canada has strong views, that is, we do not agree with the concept of so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. Our disagreement concerns both the validity of the concept and its viability (the who, when, where, why and how of its possible implementation). Canada, therefore, has the strongest reservations about the incorporation of this concept in a CTBT. Such incorporation would, at the least, give the concept renewed and updated formal recognition despite 30 years of experience and, at the most, might well encourage ongoing interest in, if not research and development of, this concept. We acknowledge that China does not fully share our views in this respect. Perhaps the Chinese perspective might be reflected otherwise in the negotiating history of our CTBT - for example, by a formal Chinese statement or by a Chinese statement shared by any others interested in the concept, or even by a Presidential statement recognizing that view at the concluding stage of our negotiations. But we sincerely believe that there is no support for the PNE concept in this Conference and thus that its actual inclusion in our collective CTBT should not be considered.

(Mr. Moher, Canada)

The third point I wish to address is that of our ongoing negotiation process. As a deeply committed delegation and as the Friend of the Chair, now moderator, on-site inspection, we are increasingly concerned over the disparity of views and complex of issues which remain to be reconciled and resolved in the extremely brief time period left to us before 28 June. Many delegations seem still to be digging deeper trenches and throwing up higher ramparts to defend initial national positions. But we are now past that stage. Through you, Mr. President, and through our Ad Hoc Committee Chairman, Ambassador Ramaker, we urge all delegations to switch gears - politically and in their negotiation strategies - so as to focus better our time and energies and to expedite compromise. Now is the time of issue integration and conciliation across the breadth of our draft treaty. We must move forward accordingly.

For our part, there are many issues upon which Canada has put forward its positions and proposed compromise solutions. Preamble, Executive Council, entry into force as well as OSI have all been subjects of our suggestions. The discipline of time precludes exploring each in turn here today. But we do hope that these suggestions, already well drawn back from our own national preferences and positions, will help us all to conclude by 28 June, our firm deadline.

Before concluding, Canada has also put forward its positions on two themes of great importance for the future viability, enhanced credibility and continuing success of this Conference. The first is membership. We have for several years now strongly advocated and supported steps to expand the membership of this body so as to respond to all of the applications for full membership before us. Against that background, we support the current initiative to achieve, at least partially, that objective. We hope that effort will be successful as soon as possible and that we will then be able to build on that success for further necessary expansion. As for our future agenda, Canada's position is well known - having been advanced orally and in writing on numerous occasions. We hope early agreement on this theme can be achieved as well.

Disarmament is a vital ingredient, indeed an essential component, of any viable effort to promote true international peace and security. The Conference on Disarmament has a critical contribution to make to such efforts, globally and regionally. We must conclude an effective CTBT within two weeks. And we must begin to look forward to further challenges thereafter. Canada pledges itself to continuing contributions and cooperation in that regard.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now have pleasure in giving the floor to the representative of New Zealand, Ambassador Armstrong.

Mr. ARMSTRONG (New Zealand): Mr. President, let me first congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency. You are presiding over a period in the history of the Conference on Disarmament which could record two outstanding achievements - the conclusion of the CTBT negotiations and the expansion of the membership to include another 23 countries, including New Zealand. Both these goals are of the highest importance to New Zealand,

(Mr. Armstrong, New Zealand)

and it therefore goes without saying that you have my delegation's full support in all your endeavours to guide the Conference to success on both counts.

I have taken the floor to convey to the Conference the New Zealand Government's serious concern and disappointment at the conduct by China of a nuclear test on 8 June. The New Zealand Prime Minister has responded strongly to news of the test. New Zealand considers that it was all the more disappointing because it took place at a time when all other nuclear-weapon States are observing moratoria, and because the CTBT negotiations have reached a crucial final stage. My Prime Minister has also urged China to conduct no further tests, and to lend its full support to the conclusion of the test ban negotiations by the end of June, in particular to confirm its support for a treaty which bans all nuclear explosions and which enables quick and effective investigation of all evidence of treaty breaches. New Zealand's serious concerns regarding this nuclear test have been conveyed to the Chinese authorities in Wellington and Beijing.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of New Zealand for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now have pleasure in giving the floor to the representative of Switzerland, Ambassador Hofer.

Mr. HOFER (Switzerland) (translated from French): Mr. President, this is the first time that my delegation has had the honour of taking the floor under your presidency. On this happy occasion allow me to express my satisfaction at being able to work together with you in this way. I would like to assure you of my delegation's full support to you as you carry out your task at this crucial juncture in the history of the Conference on Disarmament.

Crucial for two reasons. First of all, this institution has reached a point of no return in the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. In lending full support to the appeal of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Switzerland fervently wishes to see these negotiations completed by the end of this month. My authorities have already taken the necessary steps which will allow Switzerland to honour the commitments which will stem from the treaty. In particular, Switzerland is ready to offer its services in the important field of verification.

Our support for the work under way can also be seen in our commitment as the host State for the Conference on Disarmament. The Swiss Government, in close cooperation with the authorities in Geneva, is trying to create and further improve the most favourable conditions for the proper functioning of the Conference. Whilst exhausting all the possibilities afforded by observer status in the Conference - I will come back to that in a moment - the Swiss authorities are following with very special attention the international developments which affect the work of the Conference. Thus on 6 June Switzerland took note with satisfaction of the statement made by the head of the delegation of the People's Republic of China on the subject of so-called "peaceful" nuclear tests. On the other hand, Switzerland regrets the Chinese nuclear test carried out on 8 June, and fears the complications that this new explosion may raise during the final phase of the negotiations. The Swiss

(Mr. Hofer, Switzerland)

authorities hope that China will abandon the idea of conducting further nuclear tests before the future treaty enters into force, and that as of now it will observe a moratorium on all nuclear explosions, whatever their nature.

The second problem which I would briefly like to touch upon today relates to the expansion of the Conference on Disarmament to a greater number of members. Such an expansion would be a decisive step towards representing the international community in a manner more in keeping with present-day realities. By bringing in the 23 countries which are candidates for membership, including Switzerland, the Conference could in a much more adequate way promote the aim of arms control and disarmament, to which our peoples and Governments are profoundly attached.

The Conference has before it a clear and unconditional proposal. It is based on a rare and remarkable consensus within a group of States, the G-23. These countries have the priority aim of making a contribution to the Conference and to the international community as full members. Any obstacle placed artificially in the way of their joining clearly runs the risk of preventing the Conference from taking a crucial step in its history. The expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament and the conclusion of the negotiations on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty could constitute a twofold success which would consolidate the foundations of the Conference with a view to the future work which awaits it. This is why the Swiss authorities make an appeal for the "spirit of Geneva" based on conciliation and on concrete and effective progress, to prevail in these two extremely important areas.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Switzerland for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now have pleasure in giving the floor to the representative of Germany, Ambassador Hoffmann.

Mr. HOFFMANN (Germany): At the outset, Mr. President, let me congratulate you on the assumption of your important office. As you know, we count on you in your capacity as CD President as well as leader of the Pakistan delegation for our joint efforts to conclude the CTBT negotiations by the end of this month.

Immediately after the Chinese test explosion of 8 June, which was measured by the German primary seismic station, my Minister for Foreign Affairs made the following statement.

> "With regret I have noted the latest nuclear-weapon test of the People's Republic of China. It depreciates the flexible approach China has shown recently over the issue of peaceful nuclear explosions. As I have reaffirmed time and again, I am as a matter of principle against all testing of nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon tests are a relic of the cold war and have no longer any justification whatsoever.

(Mr. Hoffmann, Germany)

"Nuclear-weapon tests are contrary to the spirit and objectives of the Geneva nuclear-test-ban treaty negotiations, which have now entered the critical final phase. Nor can such tests be considered in keeping with the results of the New York conference on the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

"The achievement of a truly comprehensive ban on all nuclear tests, permitting no exceptions whatsoever, is a matter of personal concern to me. Accordingly, we are making every possible effort to bring the Geneva nuclear-test-ban negotiations to a successful conclusion by the autumn of this year."

We listened with great interest to the assurance of Ambassador Sha on 10 June that China will conduct one more nuclear-test explosion and will declare a moratorium thereafter. While we regret that China finds another test necessary, we will welcome the declaration of a moratorium, which will be in line with our common aim to sign a CTBT at the earliest.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Germany for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now have pleasure in giving the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador Starr.

Mr. STARR (Australia): It was with deep regret that my Government learned of nuclear-weapon testing conducted by the People's Republic of China on 8 June. Australia's long-standing and resolute opposition to nuclear testing by any State is well known. Like other non-nuclear-weapon States, we have clearly and repeatedly registered our concerns over recent years, both in public and in private. Consequently, the latest test has, like those before it, been condemned unequivocally by both the Prime Minister of Australia and our Foreign Minister.

We have noted that in connection with this test, the Chinese Government has foreshadowed the introduction of a moratorium on nuclear testing after conducting one final nuclear test before September this year. We have repeatedly urged the imposition of such a moratorium on nuclear testing. In this context, we welcome this positive development in policy. Nevertheless, what we, together with the vast majority of the international community seek, is the complete and final ending - now - of all nuclear testing anywhere and for all time. The prospect of even one more nuclear test compounds the risk posed by last weekend's test. We cannot but regret any undermining of this final and delicate stage of our negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The nuclear test ban we are seeking to negotiate in this Conference, in time for signature at the outset of the fifty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly in September, is critically important. It is a litmus test of the commitment of negotiating States to our common objective. Any that continue to test bear a special responsibility for the successful conclusion of our negotiation in just over two weeks' time.

(Mr. Starr, Australia)

It is clear that the international community as a whole has put behind it the outdated logic of the nuclear confrontation of the cold war. States are determined to wind back the threat posed by the further development and proliferation of nuclear weapons, and have recommitted themselves to these objectives. Continuing nuclear explosions - the tell-tale signs of an ongoing nuclear arms race - have no place in the world we are collectively committed to build.

We therefore strongly urge China, as the only nuclear-weapon State still testing, to join the other nuclear-weapon States in desisting from testing without further delay, pending entry into force of the CTBT.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador de Icaza.

Mr. de ICAZA (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, you know how pleased my delegation is to see you chairing the Conference at this important and sensitive stage of our work. We know and appreciate your many qualities and we trust in you to lead us. I would also like to thank the Ambassador of Nigeria, Ejoh Abuah, for the effective way in which he chaired the Conference during his term of office.

Once again the Government of Mexico regrets the fact that a further nuclear explosion was carried out for testing purposes on 8 June, and the fact that the People's Republic of China has announced that it will carry out another test before the month of September. Nuclear tests must cease and must cease immediately. In the present circumstances of international détente, the upgrading of nuclear arsenals is not justified, nor is it compatible with the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the Conference on the extension and review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, where they committed themselves, barely a year ago, to exercise the utmost restraint where testing was concerned. Such tests generate uncertainties about the international non-proliferation regime.

Explosions aimed at upgrading nuclear weapons or developing the techniques necessary to achieve that upgrading without the need to test them by explosions constitute an obstacle to our efforts to reach agreement this month on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty that would put an end to the nuclear arms race and allow us to begin a process of eliminating weapons whose mere existence jeopardizes the survival of mankind. The Mexican delegation has repeatedly urged all nuclear-weapon States to observe a testing moratorium until the entry into force of the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The announcement by the People's Republic of China that it will impose a moratorium on nuclear tests would respond to our expectations if that moratorium were to be immediate rather than being the consequence of a series of tests which has not yet been concluded.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Kurokochi.

Mrs. KUROKOCHI (Japan): At the outset, Mr. President, I would like to express our satisfaction to see you presiding over the Conference on Disarmament at this very crucial period. We are at the final stage of our negotiations on the CTBT and we are fortunate to be able to rely on your skilled leadership at such a challenging time. In this task, and in all other tasks before us in the Conference on Disarmament, I assure you of the fullest cooperation of my delegation. May I also take this opportunity to express my deep appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Abuah of Nigeria, for the exemplary manner in which he carried out his important functions? I also wish to warmly welcome Ambassador Fisseha Yimer of Ethiopia, whose participation has already enriched our deliberations.

It is extremely regrettable that China conducted its nuclear test on 8 June, despite repeated appeals by Japan and the international community to stop nuclear testing. The prohibition of nuclear testing is one of the most important tasks in the international efforts for nuclear disarmament. Only last December, the United Nations General Assembly adopted, with the support of numerous countries, its resolution calling for the immediate cessation of nuclear testing. And now, here in Geneva, we are tenaciously working towards the timely conclusion of the CTBT.

Nuclear-weapon States, which enjoy special status under the NPT, bear a heavy responsibility for nuclear disarmament. They have an obligation to respond to the confidence entrusted in them by non-nuclear-weapon States by moving forward nuclear disarmament. China's nuclear testing runs entirely counter to the international efforts toward nuclear disarmament. Japan strongly urges China not to repeat its nuclear testing any further and calls upon China to take a more flexible attitude to enable the early conclusion of the CTBT negotiations. China's nuclear testing this time, ironically, highlights the significance and the necessity for us to have a CTBT as soon as possible. The Conference on Disarmament must meet the expectation of the international community by concluding the negotiations on the CTBT in the coming two weeks.

Taking this opportunity, I would like to say a few words about the CTBT negotiations. We have only two weeks to meet our deadline, but we still have many issues which remain unsolved. Some of these are issues which can be solved without much difficulty. However, there are other issues on which delegations have shown no flexibility. The only way out is to make determined efforts to work jointly towards the convergence of positions. We cannot just throw out all that we have achieved so far. I strongly hope that our negotiations will be more productive in the remaining two weeks so that, under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Ramaker, we can reach the final compromise package. My delegation reassures the Chairman of the NTBT Ad Hoc Committee of our fullest cooperation and would also like to reiterate our appreciation for the Chairman's efforts in producing the draft treaty text CD/NTB/WP.330. We regard it as a tremendous contribution that will facilitate our negotiations during this final stage.

In this connection, concerning the basic obligation of the treaty, I would like to appeal to all delegations to agree to the text contained in CD/NTB/WP.330. I am aware that some delegations would like to have more

(Mrs. Kurokochi, Japan)

in this provision, but it seems that this formulation is the only possible "consensus potential". In order to make this potential a reality, reasonable flexibility is needed regarding the preamble.

With regard to so-called peaceful nuclear explosions, Japan's position has remained unchanged: PNEs should not be allowed under the CTBT. This position is, I would say, almost consensus in the CD. Last week, the distinguished Ambassador of China announced China's decision to change its past rigid position. We regard this move as an expression of China's positive attitude toward the conclusion of the negotiations. Japan continues to urge China to accept the language contained in CD/NTB/WP.330 without any conditions.

As I said before, Japan welcomes and appreciates the Chairman's effort in providing CD/NTB/WP.330 and considers its content to be a fair, balanced "consensus potential". We have, however, a serious concern regarding one article, that is, the entry-into-force provision of the treaty. Japan has been emphasizing not only the importance of the conclusion of the negotiations but also the necessity of early and effective implementation of the treaty. The CTBT must not be only a piece of paper. Once it is concluded, it must become effective as an international law at the earliest date possible. It is Japan's serious concern that the entry-into-force formula presented in CD/NTB/WP.330 is open to too much risk that the future CTBT might not come into effect for decades. We understand the argument that a CTBT which requires the ratification of "key countries" as a condition for entry into force would pressure those countries to ratify the treaty. We consider, however, that the CTBT must be a treaty credible for the international community. If the CTBT had a formula that makes its entry into force unrealistic for a considerable length of time, the international community would question whether such a treaty will ever enter into force.

Many proposals for entry into force are being discussed, but after considering those proposals, Japan believes that the entry-into-force formula stipulating that the treaty enters into force with the ratification of "40 countries including the 5 nuclear-weapons States under the NPT" deserves a fresh look. We have come to the conclusion that it is quite important to put a legally binding ban on nuclear testing on those 5 States because they are the countries that are legally given a special status, though not eternally in our view, to possess nuclear weapons under the NPT. Of course, we are not enthusiastic about giving them the power to hold the treaty hostage, but we believe that they would not be allowed to do so in the international political arena. Therefore, as far as the treaty provision is concerned, the "40 including the 5 nuclear-weapons States" formula serves as a reasonable balance.

We are aware that some delegations insist that three additional countries be included in the "key countries" required as a prerequisite for the entry into force of the treaty. Japan is of the view that this condition will undermine the credibility that the CTBT will enter into force. If we put too many rigorous requirements into the entry-into-force provision, the entry into force of the treaty itself will become practically impossible.

(Mrs. Kurokochi, Japan)

On the issue of on-site inspection, we are fully aware that the negotiations require a series of difficult political decisions for each and every delegation and its capital. However, if each delegation continues to stick obstinately to its own positions, we will never succeed in finding an agreed text. Therefore, at this critical stage of negotiations, it is gravely important for delegations to search for the least unacceptable solutions and to negotiate to find a common formula. In this regard, we are encouraged by the useful exchange of views which took place at the moderator's meeting yesterday, and my delegation hopes that this could lead to a possible breakthrough.

Mr. BERGUÑO (Chile) (translated from Spanish): In this first formal statement under your presidency, Sir, I have the pleasure of paying tribute to your skilled guidance of our debates. Your well-know talent and extensive experience as a diplomat will help to facilitate the search for the fundamental consensuses that are urgently required at this stage of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. Allow me to reiterate my appreciation for the warm words that you spoke concerning the expansion issue when you took up your post as President of the Conference on Disarmament.

I should first like to refer to the valuable contribution represented by working paper CD/NTB/WP.330 from the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban for the purposes of the negotiation of a treaty for the comprehensive prohibition of such tests. My delegation considers that this courageous but thoughtful step was absolutely necessary and would like to express its resolute support for the initiative adopted by Ambassador Ramaker. A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, with the zero option, is possible before the end of the year, but it is not a certainty. If agreement cannot be achieved in 1996, a historic opportunity will have been missed, perhaps for many years. What is at stake is of crucial importance: the failure of these negotiations may give impetus to both horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons; it may undermine existing nuclear-free-zone treaties and efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals and move forward towards nuclear disarmament. If a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is consolidated, the nuclear arms race will decline significantly. Other initiatives, such as the prohibition of fissionable material, could prosper and contribute to the establishment of an agreed framework for systematic and progressive advance towards total nuclear disarmament. Working paper CD/NTB/WP.330 provides clear guidance in that direction, highlighting the critical areas and the political decisions that have to be taken.

For our part, while endorsing the political acceptability of this text, and pending the instructions of my Government on certain provisions, we would like to stress still more the dual nature of our concerns. The first and most fundamental is strictly legal and has to do with aspects connected to the relationship between the future treaty and already existing international disarmament agreements and those that may be established in the future. They are reflected in the preamble, in a subparagraph of article II, in the drafting of the articles on review and withdrawal, and in the proposal for an additional article to govern the interim period between the signing of the treaty and its entry into force. The proposed texts will be distributed in English with a brief explanatory note.

(Mr. Berguño, Chile)

This concern for the progressive development of international law cannot and should not be a matter for surprise when we sit in this Council chamber which honours the memory of Francisco de Vitoria and carries on its wall, in bronze letters, a few words from Francisco Suárez' De Legibus.

The second category of concerns is a practical one and relates to questions such as the financing of the international monitoring system and the arrangements for maintaining and expanding it; contributions to the preparatory commission and the organization; arrangements for access to the international data centre; regional representation in the Executive Council, in which we do not want to see a repetition of the decline in Latin American participation such as occurred with the Convention on Chemical Weapons. My country has expressed its willingness to contribute to the international monitoring system in the form of seismological, radionuclide, hydroacoustic and infrasound stations, for which it would assume responsibility, on the understanding that the costs deriving from decisions on the expansion, additional equipment and technical improvement of the monitoring network will fall on the system as a whole since they involve the whole organization. In this area, we place on record our great pleasure at seeing confirmation in the Chairman's text of the decision on the headquarters of the organization, in Vienna; and learning that preparatory studies have begun on the headquarters agreement under the skilled guidance of Ambassador Ledogar. We hope that this agreement, which relates to the excellent facilities of the Vienna International Centre and facilitates the achievement of the aims of cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) set out in article II of the draft treaty, presages other key political understandings for our common endeavour.

In the broader, systematic process in which this negotiation is taking place, major progress has been made, and Chile appreciates its full importance. In particular, we welcome once again the signing of the Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga by all the nuclear-weapon States and the signing of the African nuclear-weapon-free-zone Treaty (the Pelindaba Treaty) by the United States. We note the readiness of both the United States and China to continue consultations regarding the difficulties they have encountered with the Bangkok Treaty, which we hope will soon be overcome. We also welcome the statement by Ambassador Slipchenko of Ukraine on the completion of the process of nuclear disarmament in his motherland, which makes it one of the largest nuclear-weapon-free zones in the world. We hope that, on the resumption of the peace process in the Middle East, it will be possible to move forward towards another large zone free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. And that, as the machinery for the review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty begins its work, its principles and objectives set out under paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the resolution will also be consolidated.

There is no doubt that the conduct of the forty-fourth underground nuclear explosion by China, in the desert of Lop Nor, concerning which my Government has expressed its concern in a statement which I will ask to be circulated as a Conference document, was a discouraging sign; although we note the unilateral moratorium that the People's Republic of China is ready to apply from the month of September, which we would have liked to see applied

(Mr. Berquño, Chile)

immediately. However, of greater importance is the statement made by Ambassador Sha Zukang concerning the way in which the complex question of peaceful nuclear explosions could be resolved. As you know, we are among the delegations that have tenaciously opposed the inclusion of an article on such explosions in a treaty whose purpose is to ban all types of tests. The grounds for our opposition lie in the diversity of legal regimes in internationally enforceable treaties (art. V.2 of the Antarctic Treaty, art. 18 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and art. V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons). Ambassador Sha has harmonized these contradictory provisions and has found a solution inspired by the Antarctic Treaty formula which, in our view, could appropriately be included in the article concerning the review conference.

Turning to announcements, I am pleased to inform the Conference on Disarmament that the Chilean Parliament has approved the Convention on Chemical Weapons and that the instrument of ratification will soon be deposited, with a desire to make an effective contribution to the entry into force of this important international instrument. This Convention marked an important development in machinery for compliance with and verification of international disarmament treaties. Although its specific nature does not allow us to transfer this machinery automatically to the future comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, the political will displayed in its negotiation must inspire our work. The proper place for these negotiations, the sole global multilateral forum, is the Conference on Disarmament. However, the words used by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his recent message to this body, when he praised its representativeness in addressing the negotiations on the CTBT, were not appropriate. The Conference, as we all know, is less representative than it was when it was set up, in accordance with rule 1 of the rules of procedure, on the basis of the five acknowledged nuclear Powers and 35 others. This rule should be revised so as to adapt its wording to present-day realities and the effects of decision CD/1356. We are confident that the application of this decision under the clear and categorical terms of document CD/1403 can be carried out successfully, following removal of the obstacles to the adoption of a decision that will put an end to this difficult stage of expansion and open up prospects for the consideration of new candidatures. The proposal made by the United Kingdom, which it said it would not press, presupposes the conclusion of the first stage represented by the identification of the date of the entry of the 23 countries. On both aspects, the admission of the 23 and the consideration of new candidatures, General Assembly resolution 50/72 contains precise stipulations, setting the beginning of the 1996 session for the former matter and the rest of that session for the latter. Chile considers that the resolutions of the General Assembly, adopted by agreement among the members of the Assembly - which involves agreement among the members of the Conference on Disarmament - should be carried out in good faith.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Chile for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now have pleasure in giving the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea, Mr. Hwang.

Mr. HWANG (Republic of Korea): Mr. President, since this is the first time for my delegation to take the floor under your presidency, I would like, at the outset, to express my warm congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament.

With regard to China's resumption of nuclear testing on 8 June this year, I would like to bring to the attention of the Conference on Disarmament the text of the statement of 8 June by the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea.

> "The Government of the Republic of Korea deeply regrets that the People's Republic of China once again conducted a nuclear test at such a critical time when international efforts to conclude the comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) have heightened.
>
> "We strongly urge the Chinese Government to halt immediately any planned nuclear testing and to join international efforts for the early attainment of a nuclear-test-free world."

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Republic of Korea for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now have pleasure in giving the floor to the representative of Norway, Ambassador Skogmo.

Mr. SKOGMO (Norway): Let me join those who have congratulated you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the office of President of the Conference. The task before the Conference during the coming days will require all the diplomatic skills for which you are well known. As stated by my friend and alphabetical neighbour, New Zealand, you will have the historic opportunity and, indeed, the responsibility to preside over two important decisions by the Conference, a CTBT for which the world has been waiting impatiently for more than 30 years, and the issue of CD expansion which is important for the future credibility of the Conference.

My delegation was originally inscribed on a higher and more formal position on the speakers' list for today's meeting. Unfortunately, the visit today to the Conference by my State Secretary, Ms. Siri Bjerke, had to be postponed. My country is presently deeply engaged in negotiations on important regional arms control issues, more precisely, the implementation of the arms control part of the Dayton agreement. These negotiations are very close to a positive result, but a few remaining problems which could not be sorted out during negotiations with the parties in Oslo over the last few days had to be transferred to the Firenze meeting on Bosnia which starts this afternoon.

My country's position on the main issue before the Conference, the CTBT negotiations, has been presented in previous interventions. Let me just add my country's full agreement and support with the comment just made by the distinguished representative of Japan on the provisions for the entry into force of a CTBT.

(Mr. Skogmo, Norway)

The events of the last few days have proved, once again, the crucial importance of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The Nordic Ministers for Foreign Affairs have, in a joint statement, deeply regretted the nuclear test carried out by China on 8 June. The nuclear test is particularly disappointing in the light of the commitment undertaken by China and the other nuclear-weapon States at the NPT Conference last year to exercise the utmost restraint as regards future nuclear testing, and since the international community is expecting that the CTBT will be concluded by the end of this month. We have, however, taken due note of China's announced unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests to be introduced after the next and final test in September this year.

My country is, of course, as a candidate member of the Conference on Disarmament for some 14 years, deeply involved in the issue of the CD's expansion. We are now very close to a positive result. The obstacles stated and identified by individual members of the Conference have been addressed and removed one by one. We trust and hope that the decision on expanding the CD will be taken without further delay, hopefully even this morning.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Norway for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now have pleasure in giving the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Lars Norberg.

Mr. NORBERG (Sweden): Mr. President, I also wish to extend to you very warm congratulations upon your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I sincerely wish you success in guiding the work of the CD at this very critical moment.

I have asked for the floor to inform the Conference of the following statement made by the Foreign Minister of Sweden, Mrs. Lena Hjelm-Wallén, following the Chinese nuclear-weapon test on 8 June 1996. The Foreign Minister, inter-alia, said: "I deeply deplore the fact that China continues its nuclear testing. We strongly reject these tests and urge the Chinese Government to cease testing and actively contribute to the conclusion very soon of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The Swedish Government gives the highest priority to the conclusion of the negotiations in June this year, not least against the background of the latest test, it is essential to achieve at the earliest an international ban on all nuclear weapons test explosions or any other nuclear explosions".

Let me add in this connection that we have also taken note of the declaration of China to exercise a moratorium on nuclear testing as from a certain date in the months to come. We welcome this declaration which means that once the Chinese moratorium will be established, all the five nuclear-weapons States will observe moratoria on further nuclear testing.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now have pleasure in giving the floor to the representative of Belgium, Mr. de Roover.

Mr. de ROOVER (Belgium) (translated from French): First of all, Mr. President, allow me to say how pleased my delegation is to see you in the Chair. We are confident that your experience and skill will make an effective contribution to the tasks we have set ourselves.

I am taking the floor today to announce that the Belgian Government is extremely disappointed following the recent nuclear test conducted by the People's Republic of China on 8 June. The development of new nuclear weapons runs counter to the logic of nuclear disarmament which has been pursued in recent years. Belgium notes that the People's Republic of China intends to respect a moratorium on nuclear tests of September 1996. This will be a step forward in the implementation of our efforts with a view to banning all nuclear tests from the planet. My delegation welcomes the positive attitude displayed recently by China and Ambassador Sha in the negotiations on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. It is in that spirit that Belgium appeals to China to refrain from all further nuclear tests in the future.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Belgium for his statement. I now have pleasure in giving the floor to the representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Yumjav.

Mr. YUMJAV (Mongolia): Mr. President, since I am taking the floor for the first time under your presidency, allow me to congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency of the CD at this crucial juncture of its work. We are convinced that your diplomatic skills and your devotion to the cause of disarmament will advance our important common goal to conclude a CTBT.

I have asked for the floor to join those delegations who expressed their concern and disappointment at the conducting by China of a nuclear test on 8 June 1996. Mongolia, as a neighbouring country, regrets that the People's Republic of China conducted a nuclear-weapon test at a time when the other nuclear-weapons States are observing moratoria on tests, and the multilateral negotiations on concluding a CTBT have reached their final decisive stage. The Foreign Ministry of Mongolia deplored the latest Chinese nuclear test and issued a statement. The statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, which was circulated as an official document of the CD, indicates that China will conduct another nuclear test and will exercise a moratorium on nuclear testing. While we regret that the People's Republic of China is going to conduct another test, we welcome the decision of the Government of the People's Republic of China to initiate a moratorium on nuclear testing.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement and for all the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now have pleasure in giving the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, first, I would like also to express my congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency at this critical time in the history of the Conference on Disarmament, and to assure you of the full support of my delegation. I would also congratulate your predecessor, Ambassador Abuah of Nigeria, for the exemplary way in which he carried out his responsibilities as President.

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In an 8 June White House statement concerning China's nuclear testing that day, the United States expressed its deep regret at those developments and urged China to refrain from further nuclear tests and to join in a global moratorium as the Conference on Disarmament works to complete a CTBT text, and to offer the international community an opportunity to sign a comprehensive test-ban treaty by September.

I would also like to welcome the statements today by the Ambassadors of Mexico and Mongolia concerning China's recent testing. Criticism of Chinese nuclear testing by Group of 21 members, other than in the context of criticism of French testing, is very rare and very significant.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I shall now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, Dr. Dahlman, who will present the progress report on the Group's forty-forth session, which is contained in document CD/1398.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): I am pleased to report to you on the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts that took place 20 through 24 May and to introduce the progress report from that meeting contained in CD/1398. This GSE session was attended by experts and representatives from 31 countries.

An important remaining task for the Ad Hoc Group is to maintain and develop the extensive investments made in seismic stations worldwide and in the prototype international data centre (IDC). The Group has earlier concluded that the delivery of those facilities in an operational mode to the envisaged Preparatory Commission would be a valuable contribution to the establishment of the IMS in a cost-effective way.

In reviewing the results from its Third Technical Test, which we refer to as GSETT-3, the Group noted that the test is now well into its second year of successful full-scale operation. In all 130 seismographic stations from 45 countries are at present participating on a routine basis. Of these 43 are primary stations, reporting all data continuously to the IDC, and 87 are auxiliary, reporting data on request. Sixty-seven of these operational stations are part of the envisaged IMS network. Efforts are under way to modify the GSETT-3 networks to further approach those of the IMS. I have, together with Mrs. Mackby, the GSE Secretary, and Mr. Mykkeltveit, Norway, the Convenor of the Working Group on Planning, been working with representatives from a number of countries to gain participation in GSETT-3 by new stations that have been proposed for the IMS.

The GSETT-3IDC has continued its successful operations with gradual improvements of its procedures. New extensive computer programs for the detection, association and analysis of seismic signals have recently been implemented. A preliminary evaluation shows that this has significantly increased the quality of the GSETT-3 products.

In its recent evaluation of the first full year of GSETT-3, presented in CD/1385, the Group noted several specific areas in which additional work is

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needed at the prototype IDC. These include enhancing documentation, improving procedures for data retrieval and processing and continued integration of data from other technologies into the processing system.

To obtain an independent assessment of the status of both hardware and software, with emphasis on documentation, the GSE recommends that an external audit of the prototype IDC be undertaken. This will facilitate the transfer to the future CTBT organization of the methods and software developed at the prototype IDC and of the experience gained from its test operation.

The Group also noted the need for additional work at the national data centres, one important task being to monitor and improve station performance. A number of national reports presented at the Group's session described significant improvements that have already been achieved in the operational performance of individual stations, but it is necessary to continue this work. National data centres (NDCs) also have important work to carry out in the evaluation of GSETT-3 system performance and its products.

In the extensive evaluation of the first year of GSETT-3 referred to earlier it was shown that network calibration is a prerequisite to achieve a location accuracy of 1,000 square kilometres or better at event magnitude 4 and above. It was shown that without calibration the location uncertainty for a third of the events was larger than 1,000 square kilometres even in regions where the station coverage was quite good and approaching that of the IMS networks.

Calibration of a seismic network is in principle similar to the calibration of the sight of a rifle. A expert marksman can place his shots with little scatter, but if his aiming point is not properly adjusted using calibration shots, he might constantly be off the target. In seismology, calibration will compensate for regional variations in the velocities of the seismic signals caused by heterogeneities in the interior of the Earth. It is to be carried out using reference events, either earthquakes well located by nearby local stations or large chemical explosions with known locations. As this work depends on suitable seismic events becoming available in the various regions of the Earth, it takes a long time and requires the participation of many countries around the globe. The Group discussed and agreed on an initial plan for improving event location through calibration. This plan, which is annexed to the progress report, suggests inter-alia the conduct of specific chemical calibration explosions in various regions.

To provide assistance for implementation of the CTBT, the Group recommends that a comprehensive report on GSETT-3 should be completed for the CD by August 1996 and could be made available to the Preparatory Commission. This report should contain, inter-alia, the results and current conclusions of GSETT-3. Following the completion of that report, the Group recommends the continuation of the work begun under GSETT-3 until the Preparatory Commission assumes responsibility, including financing, for the work on establishing the IMS. This would allow for the uninterrupted operation, development and evaluation of the evolving IMS, including the prototype IDC, as well as continued calibration of the IMS. The Group recommends that States

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participating in GSETT-3 plan and schedule transition to those facilities proposed for inclusion in the IMS.

To facilitate the cost-effective transition into the operational system of IMS facilities now in operation in GSETT-3 it is, in my view, important not to close the present international umbrella under which this work is carried out until a new umbrella is established.

The Group noted that training and education of experts worldwide is, and will be, an important issue. The IMS will need trained experts in all monitoring technologies, both at a national level and at the IDC. The Group noted with appreciation that several initiatives have already been taken in this regard both by individual countries and by the experimental IDC and encourages additional such initiatives in the future. I am convinced that training will become a most crucial issue not only to create the expertise needed for the IMS but also to increase the understanding of the treaty and its verification arrangements among the States parties. Extended training efforts will therefore, in my view, be needed early on in the forthcoming work to implement the IMS.

Regional workshops provide an effective means to increase knowledge about GSETT-3 and the future IMS and to encourage wider participation by countries from the actual region. The Group noted with appreciation the convening of such an informal workshop in Pretoria, South Africa for the African region from 22 to 24 April 1996, in which 35 diplomats and experts from 21 countries participated. This workshop followed a similar workshop, previously reported, for the Central and South America region held in Argentina in November 1995. A summary of the results of these two workshops is annexed to the progress report. A third such regional workshop, focusing on participation in the evolving IMS, is being planned for the South-East Asian region in September 1996.

The Group noted with appreciation the convening of an informal international conference on "Technologies to Monitor the CTBT. The Role and the Place of National Data Centres in the International Monitoring System" held in Moscow, Russia from 13 to 19 May 1996. The Conference was attended by 137 experts from 12 countries. The objective was to stimulate discussion on technical aspects of NDC operation. The Conference provided a good opportunity to discuss these issues and is expected to contribute to the process of establishing the IMS.

I will finally also recognize the eminent support provided to the Group by the secretariat, and in particular the Group's Secretary, both at our session in Geneva and in the work between the sessions, especially in our effort to solicit increased participation.

The Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, be convened from 5 to 16 August 1996. The purpose of this meeting is to review the progress of the ongoing test operation and to complete a comprehensive report on GSETT-3, to complete the

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calibration plan, to solicit increased participation by stations envisaged for the IMS and, finally, to review the technical standards for the IMS stations in light of the experience from GSETT-3.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events for his statement. I wish to inform the Conference that the recommendation contained in paragraph 16 of document CD/1398, to the effect that the forty-fifth session of the Group be convened from 5 to 16 August 1996, will be put for decision at our next plenary on Thursday, 20 June. I now have a request from the representative of China for the floor. I give the floor to Ambassador Sha.

Mr. SHA (China) (translated from Chinese): On 8 June, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China issued a statement on China's nuclear testing. I have been instructed to request the distribution of the statement as an official document of the CD. I would like to read the statement as follows.

"China conducted a nuclear test on 8 June 1996.

"China stands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and is in favour of reaching a comprehensive nuclear test ban in the process towards this objective. As early as in October 1993, the Chinese Government publicly announced that China stands for the conclusion of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996. Since then, the Chinese delegation has taken an active part in the CTBT negotiations in Geneva. China will continue to work with other countries for the conclusion, within this year, of a fair, reasonable and verifiable treaty with universal adherence and unlimited duration.

"The limited amount of nuclear weapons China possesses is solely for the purpose of self-defence and does not constitute a threat to any country. China has unilaterally and solemnly undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. It has also committed itself not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. At the same time, China strongly calls on other nuclear-weapon States for a positive response to China's initiative by immediately concluding, through negotiations, a treaty on mutual non-first use of nuclear weapons, and reaching an agreement on the unconditional non-use or non-threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones.

"In the world today, there still exist huge nuclear arsenals and the threat of a nuclear war caused by the first use of nuclear weapons. Against such a background, for the purpose of safeguarding the supreme interests of the State and the nation, China cannot but conduct the necessary and the minimum number of nuclear tests. We have all along exercised utmost restraint in conducting nuclear tests, and the number of tests we have conducted is extremely limited.

(Mr. Sha, China

"Together with the Governments and peoples of other countries in the world, the Chinese Government and people will work unremittingly and do their utmost for the realization of the lofty goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world at an early date and for the maintenance of lasting peace and universal security.

"Based on the afore-mentioned position, the Chinese Government hereby announces that before September this year, China will conduct another nuclear test to ensure the safety of its nuclear weapons. After that, China will exercise a moratorium on nuclear testing."

As everybody has noticed, the Chinese Government has declared in the statement that China will implement a moratorium on nuclear testing after September this year. I wish to point out that it is not easy for China to make such a decision. As is known to all, China has conducted the smallest number of nuclear tests among the five nuclear-weapon States. China's nuclear weapons are no match for those of nuclear super-Powers in terms of quantity and quality. Besides, China has unilaterally undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances, and has called for other nuclear-weapon States to undertake the same commitment and to conclude a treaty on mutual non-first use of nuclear weapons. However, some nuclear-weapon States have ignored China's appeal and have so far not responded positively to China's proposal. Despite this circumstance, China declares that it will implement a moratorium on nuclear testing, on the one hand, to respond to the legitimate demand of the broad non-nuclear-weapon States and, on the other hand, to push forward the ongoing CTBT negotiations. China's sincerity in seeking to conclude a CTBT as early as possible is beyond doubt. Just now some delegations of non-nuclear-weapon States have expressed their concern at China's nuclear test and its possible impact on the CTBT negotiations. The Chinese delegation understands their concern. However, a certain nuclear super-Power and its military allies under its nuclear protection have made some unwarranted remarks on China's extremely limited number of nuclear tests, irrespective of China's legitimate security concerns. This is totally unacceptable. The Chinese delegation would like to call upon them to concentrate their efforts on the negotiations and show the necessary flexibility so as to make concrete efforts to conclude the CTBT negotiations by the end of June.

A moment ago, certain delegations again mentioned the question of PNEs. There are different views on this matter, and this is nothing strange. As is known to everyone, PNEs are not a Chinese invention. PNEs are legitimized by the NPT Treaty, and the NPT was not drafted by the Chinese. As is also known to all, China became a party to that treaty more than 20 years later. If some delegations want to use the CTBT to perpetually ban PNEs, then why did they not call for amendment of the NPT at the Review Conference held in May last year, or at many an NPT review conference held before? The Chinese delegation has its own national position on PNEs. However, in order to promote the early conclusion of the CTBT, the Chinese delegation has exercised maximum flexibility. We call upon the relevant delegations to show the same flexibility in order to find a solution acceptable to all. Sticking to each delegation's own national position will only bring to the negotiations negative influences that the Chinese delegation is not willing to see.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of China for his statement. That concludes the list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? That does not seem to be the case.

With respect to the issue of expansion of the membership of the Conference, and the proposal for a draft decision presented by the representative of Argentina in document CD/1403, we have had further intensive consultations over the past few days. This morning, some developments have been intimated which apparently require consideration. One regional group has sought an opportunity to have a brief meeting to consider these developments. Therefore, it would be my intention to suspend this meeting for about half an hour in order to allow this regional group to meet in this Chamber, and for others to hold consultations with regard to this issue. Following this suspension, I would intend to reconvene in an informal meeting of the States members of the Conference on Disarmament to discuss the issue. Thereafter, we could reconvene in this plenary meeting. Would there be any objection to this procedure which I have suggested? That does not seem to be the case. This meeting is suspended for about 40 minutes.

The meeting was suspended at 12 noon and resumed at 1.10 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 738th plenary meeting is resumed.

With regard to the question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference, the consultations on the matter are still continuing. I will convene Presidential consultations on this issue tomorrow evening at 6 p.m. Following that, we will revert to the matter early next week, perhaps even as early as Monday, and, if necessary, convene a special plenary meeting for this purpose. I hope that this procedure has your concurrence. There is no objection?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Before we discuss the timetable for next week's sessions of the Ad Hoc Committee in groups, I have a request from the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Ramaker, who has asked me to announce that the meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban this afternoon will take place at 3 p.m. in room III, rather than in room I.

The secretariat has circulated, at my request, a tentative timetable of meetings to be held next week. This timetable was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and is, as usual, merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. The details of the timetable of meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban will be given by its Chairman, I understand, at the meeting of the open-ended Bureau of the Committee which will be held tomorrow.

I would like to inform you that one of the groups has made a request that it requires full facilities for three hours, from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. on Wednesdays, to discharge all the functions of group coordination at the Wednesday morning meetings. I would suggest that this matter be discussed

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also in the open-ended Bureau of the Ad Hoc Committee since the timetable for various groups had been evolved as a result of an agreement in those consultations some weeks ago. So, while noting the request of that group, we will take this up, if you agree, in the open-ended Bureau.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday 20 June 1996 at 10 a.m. However, as I mentioned earlier, in the context of expansion of membership, we should all be prepared to hold a plenary meeting early next week.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.